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Abstract: 
 
 This research aims to observe the consequences of going concern opinion (GCO) and 
examine the role of specialist accounting firms for the financial reports of business firms and 
capital markets. The research is based on an experimental study consisting of 107 
undergraduate and graduate students who were asked to act as financial analysts.  
 
The GCO consequence for the financial reports of business firms is that the stock price of the 
corresponding firms will decline, but the decline will be smaller if the financial reports are 
audited by specialist accounting firms. The GCO consequence for rival firms is that the stock 
prices of the rival firms will rise if other companies in the same industry receive GCO, but the 
increase will be smaller if the companies receiving GCO are audited by specialized 
accounting firms.  
 
The GCO consequences of the capital markets is that the stock prices of all companies, the 
composite index and the market participants will increase, but the presence of a specialized 
accounting firm has not been proven to strengthen the market participants’ willingness to 
participate further in the stock market. 
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1. Introduction 
In Indonesia, based on SA (Audit Standard) Section 570-Business Continuity (IAPI, 
2013), auditors are allowed to publish an opinion that contains a description of the 
auditor’s doubts on the ability of a company to maintain its viability. This opinion is 
known as going concern opinion (GCO). Conditions and events that trigger the 
auditor to issue GCO are also stated in SA 570. Research on the GCO usually focuses 
on (1) auditor judgment in determining whether the auditor needs to modify the audit 
opinion by giving an explanation about the viability, (2) errors that may occur in the 
issuance of GCO, (3) individual GCO consequences for companies receiving GCO 
(announcing firms), (4) GCO consequences for other companies in the same industry 
(rival firms). 
There have not been many researchs studying the possibility of the GCO to play an 
important role in the stabilization of the stock price in a stock market or to play an 
important role in enhancing the credibility of financial statements for other 
companies which do not receive GCO (Tuttle and Vandervelde, 2009). There has 
been no study that simultaneously examines the consequences of GCO for 
announcing firms, rival firms, and the overall capital market using the same data 
source. Therefore, this study will examine the consequences of GCO for announcing 
firms, rival firms and the capital market as a whole. 
Researches on the consequences of GCO for announcing firms generally show that 
according to investors the GCO is relevant to assess the companies’ share price. 
O'Reilly (2010), who examined the consequences of GCO for announcing firms 
argues that announcing firms experienced a significant decline in stock prices. Stock-
price estimation made by investors was much reduced when a company received 
GCO than when it received an unqualified opinion. This indicates that GCO is bad 
news for announcing firms. 
GCO consequences for rival firms indicate one of two phenomena, namely 
competitive effect or contagion effect. Competitive effect occurs when rival firms get 
the positive impact from other companies in the same industry which receive GCO 
(indicated by an increase in the stock prices of rival firms). The contagion effect 
occurs when rival firms get the negative impact of the presence of other companies in 
the same industry which obtain GCO (indicated by a decrease in the stock prices of 
rival firms). Researches on the consequences of GCO for rival firms generally show 
support for competitive effect.  
Elliott et al. (2006) show that at the moment when certain companies receive GCO in 
the real estate industry, investors will move their business and their holdings to rival 
firms. It can be stated that Elliott et al. (2006) show more support for the competitive 
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effect. This indicates that GCO is good news for rival firms. Coelho et al. (2012) 
show that rival firms experience positive abnormal returns and announcing firms 
experience negative abnormal returns on the date of the audit report. It can be 
concluded that Coelho et al. (2012) show more support for the competitive effect 
than the contagion effect. This indicates that GCO is good news for rival firms, but is 
bad news for announcing firms.The possibility as to whether the competitive effect 
can be turned into contagion effect has been rarely investigated. This study used an 
experimental method to manipulate the number of GCOs in every industry. Thus, the 
results should show whether at the time when the number of GCOs increases in an 
industry, the benefits gained by rival firms will decrease. 
Research on the consequences of GCO for the stock market as a whole is still rarely 
conducted. This is due to the difficulty in obtaining the required data. Therefore, 
Tuttle and Vanderveldes (2009) used an experimental method to manipulate GCO by 
making two experimental markets (one with GCO and the other without GCO). The 
market with GCO was a capital market in which there was GCO, while the market 
without GCO was a capital market in which there was no GCO. In the market with 
GCO, only companies which received GCO experienced a stock price decline. This 
shows that GCO can play an important role in the stock price stabilization. On the 
other hand, in the market without GCO, all of the companies’ stock prices declined, 
regardless of whether these companies deserved it to or not. This occurred because a 
market without GCO had a higher degree of uncertainty than a market with GCO. 
Uncertainty in a market has been studied by Akerlof (1970) who proved that used-car 
buyers who were not able to differentiate between the quality of a good car and the 
quality of an inferior car tended not to be willing to buy a used car at a high price. 
The uncertain condition in this study can be said to be the same as the uncertainty in 
the market without GCO. If in a capital market, there is no GCO (assuming that there 
must be companies experiencing financial distress in the capital market), then 
investors have difficulty to distinguish between companies that are able to survive 
and companies that are not able to survive. Investors who are in condition of high 
uncertainty will potentially lower stock prices to protect themselves from unexpected 
events, particularly company bankruptcy. To know the consequences of GCO for the 
stock market as a whole, this present study observes three things. The first is whether 
company stock prices in the market with GCO are higher than those in the market 
without GCO. The second is whether the composite index in the market with GCO is 
higher than the composite index in the market without GCO. The third is whether the 
number of market participants in the market with GCO is higher than that of those in 
the market without GCO. 
Researches on the consequences of GCO have rarely considered auditors’ reputation, 
which might act as a moderating variable. Almutairi (2007) shows that companies 
audited by highly reputed accounting firms can reap high economic value. Clients 
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experiencing financial distress enjoy higher economic value than those not 
experiencing financial distress. Auditors’ reputation in this study is proxied by the 
reputation of industry-specialist accounting firms. 
This research is expected to contribute on theoretical and methodological benefits. 
First, this present study simultaneously examines the consequences of GCO for 
announcing firms, rival firms and the capital market as a whole using the same data 
source. Previous studies generally examined the consequences of GCO only for 
announcing firms and rival firms. Second, this study uses auditors’ reputation as a 
moderating variable. Previous studies have not considered auditors’ reputation as a 
moderating variable. Third, this study examines whether competitive effect can be 
turned into contagion effect.  
This study uses an experimental method to manipulate the number of GCOs in every 
industry. Thus, it will be known whether at the time when the number of GCOs is 
higher in an industry, the benefits received by rival firms will decrease. The 
methodological contribution of this research is that it examines the consequences of 
GCO use an experimental method with two experimental markets, namely the market 
with GCO and the market without GCO. An experimental method can overcome the 
difficulty of finding a market without GCO, which is hard to find in the real world 
setting. 
2. Overview Theory and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Overview Theory 
The essence of signaling theory is how accounting can be used to give signals about 
the condition of a company. Managers of companies that perform well will try to 
show a good signal to stakeholders. On the other hand, managers of less well 
performing companies have an incentive to show unfavorable signal to stakeholders 
to maintain their companies’ credibility in the capital market (Godfrey et al., 2010). 
The signal responded by investors is reflected in an increase or decrease in the stock 
price of a company. In relation to a company’s viability, an auditor may issue GCO if 
the audited client experiences the conditions and the events stated in the SA Section 
570-Business Continuity. In these circumstances, GCO has the role as a signal which 
contains information about the doubtful company survival. According to O'Reilly 
(2010), GCO has the role as an informational signal if the auditor is in a position that 
is more competent to assess the viability of the company than other parties and if the 
auditor will have negative consequences if it does not publish GCO. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 GCO and Stock Price Announcing Firms 
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Based on the SA Section 570-Business Continuity, after taking into consideration the 
conditions and events experienced by an entity as well as other relevant factors, an 
auditor may issue GCO. Unlike an unqualified opinion that is expected by all parties, 
GCO is not expected because it reflects considerable doubt upon the entity's ability to 
maintain its viability. This causes the GCO to be responded negatively by 
stakeholders. 
In general, announcing firms get negative consequences when they receive GCO 
(Elliott et al. 2006; Schaub, 2006; O’Reilly et al., 2006; O'Reilly, 2010; Carson et al., 
2012; Coelho et al., 2012; Amin et al., 2014). O’Reilly et al. (2006) and O'Reilly 
(2010) shows that GCO negatively affect the stock-price estimation. Based on these 
studies, the stock price estimation of announcing firms made by the financial analysts 
is lower when the auditor issues GCO than when the auditor issues an unqualified 
opinion. Based on the above explanation, a hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
H1a:  Stock price estimation of announcing firms made by financial analysts is 
lower when the auditor issues GCO than when the auditor issues an 
unqualified opinion 
2.2.2 GCO, Stock Price of Announcing Firms, and Auditors’ Reputation 
Based on research conducted by O’Reilly et al. (2006), the negative consequences of 
GCO to the stock price estimation can be reduced by the presence of an auditor as an 
insurer. The auditor as an insurer can be said to be able to guarantee the loss 
recovery. It can be argued that the loss recovery acts as a variable that can moderate 
the influence of GCO to the stock price. O’Reilly et al. (2006) conducted a study in 
countries that allow auditors to ensure the loss recovery, whose condition is different 
from that in Indonesia, where it can be said that there is no guarantee of loss 
recovery. Therefore, it is necessary to have another moderating variable that can 
minimize the negative consequences of GCO to the stock prices of announcing firms. 
The moderating variable that is used in this study is the auditor reputation that is 
proxied by the reputation of industry-specialized auditors. Based on the research 
conducted by Almutairi (2007), specialist accounting firm clients can gain a greater 
economic value (higher credit rating and lower cost of debt) than non-specialist 
accounting firm clients. The economic value is higher for specialist accounting firm 
clients experiencing financial distress than that for specialist accounting firm clients 
who did not experience financial distress. Accordingly, specialized industry auditors 
are expected to provide economic value for announcing firms experiencing financial 
distress. In this case, economic value has the potential to minimize the negative 
consequences likely to be received by announcing firms. Based on the above 
explanation, the second hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
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H1b:  Industry-specialist accounting firms can reduce the negative effect of GCO 
on an announcing firm’s stock price.  
2.2.3 GCO and Stock Price of Rival Firms 
GCO consequences for rival firms indicate one of two phenomena, namely 
competitive effect or contagion effect (Coelho et al., 2012). Competitive effect 
occurs when rival firms get the positive impact from other companies in the same 
industry, which receive GCO (indicated by an increase in the stock prices of rival 
firms). The contagion effect occurs when rival firms obtain the negative impact from 
other companies in the same industry, which receive GCO (indicated by a decline in 
the stock price of rival firms). 
Elliott et al. (2006) and Coelho et al. (2012) show that at the moment when 
companies receive GCO in an industry, investors will move their business and their 
holdings to rival firms. Thus, the rival firms’ stock prices will increase. It can be said 
that Elliott et al. (2006) show more support to competitive effect than contagion 
effect. This indicates that GCO is good news for rival firms. Based on the above 
explanation, the next hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H2a:  The stock prices of companies that do not receive GCO (rival firms) increase if 
other companies in the same industry receive GCO 
2.2.4 GCO, Stock Price of Rival Firms and Auditors’ Reputation 
In general, rival firms get positive consequences of GCO received by announcing 
firms as indicated by the increase in their stock prices (Elliott et al., 2006; Coelho et 
al., 2012). In this case, the competitive effect takes place. However, researches on the 
consequences of GCO for rival firms rarely consider the use of a moderating 
variable. A moderating variable that is used in this present study is auditors’ 
reputation, which is proxied by specialized industry auditors. Based on the research 
conducted by Almutairi (2007), specialist accounting firm clients can obtain a greater 
economic value (higher credit rating and lower cost of debt) than non-specialist 
accounting firm clients. The economic value is higher for specialist accounting firm 
clients experiencing financial distress than that for specialist accounting firm clients 
who do not experience financial distress. Accordingly, specialized industry auditors 
are expected to provide economic value to announcing firms, which can potentially 
reduce the resulting competitive effect. In other words, the positive consequences to 
be received by rival firms will be reduced. Based on the above explanation, a 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
H2b:  Industry-specialist accounting firms can weaken the positive influence of GCO 
on rival firms’ stock prices.  
2.2.5 GCO and Stock Price of All Companies on a Capital Market 
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Research on the consequences of GCO for the stock market as a whole have been 
rarely conducted. This is due to the difficulty in obtaining the required data. 
Therefore, Tuttle and Vanderveldes (2009) used an experimental method to 
manipulate GCO by making two experimental markets (a market with GCO and a 
market without GCO). The market with GCO is a capital market in which there is 
GCO and the market without GCO is a capital market without any GCO. In their 
experiment, in the market with GCO only companies which received GCO 
experienced stock price decline. On the contrary, in the market without GCO, all 
companies experienced a stock price decline, regardless of the fact whether the 
companies deserved the stock price decline or not. This happened because of the 
uncertainty in the market without GCO was higher than the uncertainty in the market 
with GCO. 
Uncertainty in a market has been studied by Akerlof (1970) who proved that car 
buyers who were not able to differentiate between the quality of a good car and the 
quality of an inferior car tended to be more willing to buy a used car at a high price. 
The uncertainty condition can be said to be the same as the uncertainty in the market 
without GCO. If in a capital market, there is a GCO (assuming there must be 
companies experiencing financial distress in the capital markets), investors 
experience difficulty to distinguish between companies that are able to survive and 
companies that are not able to survive. Investors who are in a condition of high 
uncertainty will potentially lower stock prices to protect themselves from unexpected 
events, particularly company bankruptcy.  
Researchers assume that in a capital market, there must be companies that experience 
financial distress as identified in various studies. Setyarno et al. (2006) suggest that 
38.46% of manufacturing companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
experienced financial distress between the years 2000 to 2004. Similarly, Setyowati 
(2009) shows that 36.23% of manufacturing companies on the IDX experienced 
financial distress from the years 2001 to 2005. Widyantari (2011) states that 17.24% 
of manufacturing companies on the IDX also experienced financial distress from 
2001 to 2009. Amin et al. (2014) write that 5,457 non-financial companies 
experienced financial distress from 2000 to 2010, while Myers et al. (2014) report 
that 17,259 companies experienced financial distress from 2000 to 2006. 
Although there are always companies experiencing financial distress in a capital 
market, it does not necessarily mean that the companies receive GCO (Setyarno et 
al., 2006; Setyowati, 2009; Widyantari, 2011). According to Blay et al. (2001), GCO 
serves as a tool for communicating the risk of companies in financial distress. If in a 
stock market, there is no GCO, the risk of companies in financial distress is less 
adequately communicated. Investors with high uncertainty of the capital market will 
potentially decrease the stock prices to protect themselves from unexpected events, 
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particularly company bankruptcy. Based on the above explanation, a hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
H3a:  The stock price of a company on the market with GCO is higher than the stock 
price on the market without GCO. 
2.2.6 GCO, Stock Price of All Companies on a Capital Market and Auditors’ 
Reputation 
The presence of GCO can minimize uncertainty in the capital markets. This allows 
investors to identify companies that deserve investment. In the market with GCO, 
only companies with GCO will potentially experience a stock price decline. On the 
other hand, in the market without GCO, stock prices of all companies will decline, 
regardless of whether the companies deserve the stock price decline or not (Tuttle 
and Vandervelde, 2009). 
The research conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde, (2009) has not considered a 
potential moderating variable that strengthens the ability of GCO in stabilizing stock 
prices. The moderating variable that is used in this present study is auditors’ 
reputation that is proxied with specialized industry auditors. Based on the research 
conducted by Almutairi (2007) specialist accounting firm clients can obtain a greater 
economic value than non-specialist accounting firm clients. Accordingly, specialized 
industry auditors are expected to provide economic value for a stock market. Based 
on the above explanation, a hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H3b:  Industry-specialist accounting firms can strengthen the positive influence of 
GCO on stock prices in the stock market. 
2.2.7 GCO and the Composite Index 
The composite index covers overall movements of the prices of common stocks and 
preferred stocks (Susanto and Sabardi, 2010). In a capital market with lower 
uncertainty, the stock prices in a market with GCO will be higher than the stock 
prices in a market without GCO. This is consistent with the result of the research of 
Akerlof (1970) which states that market participants in conditions of high uncertainty 
tend not to be willing to buy products at high prices. It can be said that the 
movements of stock prices in a market with GCO will be safer than the stock price 
movements in a market without GCO. In other words, a market with GCO has a 
higher composite index than a market without GCO. Based on the above explanation, 
a hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
H3c: The composite index in the market with GCO is higher than the composite 
index in the market without GCO 
2.2.8 GCO, Composite Index, and the Auditor Reputation 
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Based on the research conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009) in the market 
with GCO only companies with GCO experience stock price decline. On the contrary 
in a market without GCO stock prices of all companies experience a stock price 
decline regardless of whether they deserve the decline or not. It shows that the 
movements of stock prices in a market with GCO will be safer than the stock price 
movements in a market without GCO. In other words, a market with GCO has a 
composite index that is higher than that in a market without GCO. 
The research conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009) has not considered a 
potential moderating variable which can strengthen the ability of GCO in stabilizing 
stock prices. A moderating variable that is used in this study is auditors’ reputation 
that is proxied with specialized industry auditors. Based on the research conducted by 
Almutairi (2007) specialist accounting firm clients can obtain a greater economic 
value than non-specialist accounting firm clients. Accordingly, specialized industry 
auditors are expected to provide more economic value for a stock market. The 
economic value can potentially produce a higher composite index in a market with 
GCO. Based on the above explanation, a hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H3d:  Industry-specialist accounting firms can strengthen the positive influence of 
GCO on the composite index  
2.2.9 GCO and Market Participants 
The uncertainty in a market without GCO is higher than that in a market with GCO 
(Tuttle and Vandervelde, 2009). If in a stock market no companies receive GCO, 
investors will find difficulty in identifying companies with doubtful survival. 
Investors have different risk preferences, so the willingness of investors to participate 
in an uncertain capital market also varies. Based on the research conducted by Tuttle 
and Vandervelde (2009) market participants may decline if the uncertainty is higher. 
This indicates that a market with GCO will potentially have a higher number of 
participants than a market without GCO. Based on the above explanation, a 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H3e: Market participants’ willingness to participate further in the market with GCO 
is higher than the willingness of those in a market without GCO. 
2.2.10 GCO, Market Participants, and Auditors’ Reputation 
Based on the research conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009) uncertainty in a 
market without GCO is higher than that in a market with GCO. The conditions of 
high uncertainty lead to market participant decline. It can be argued that market 
participants are not willing to participate in a capital market that does not allow them 
to identify companies with doubtful survival. 
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The research conducted by Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009) has not considered a 
potential moderating variable that can strengthen the ability of GCO in stabilizing 
stock prices. The moderating variable used in this present study is the auditors’ 
reputation that is proxied with specialized industry auditors. Based on the research 
conducted by Almutairi (2007), specialist accounting firm clients can obtain a greater 
economic value than non-specialist accounting firm clients. Accordingly, specialized 
industry auditors are expected to provide economic value for a capital market by 
increasing market participants’ willingness to participate further in the market with 
GCO. Based on the above explanation, a hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
H3f: Industry-specialist accounting firms can strengthen the positive influence of 
GCO on market participants. 
III.  Research Methodology 
3.1 Experiment 
This present research was a laboratory experiment because undergraduate and 
graduate students who were subjects in the experiment were required to act as 
financial analysts. Each experiment subject was asked to fill one of the four cases 
presented randomly. The experiment was carried out with a 2 x 2 factorial design 
between the subjects, which allowed testing the main effects and interaction effects 
(Zikmund, 2003). The design of the experiment was presented in Table 1. This study 
modified the experiment instrument developed by O’Reilly et al. (2006), O'Reilly 
(2010), and Tuttle and Vandervelde (2009). The experimental subjects were asked to 
estimate the stock prices of 40 fictional companies that were grouped into four 
industries (Industries 1, 2, 3, and 4). The subjects were asked to estimate the stock 
prices at Time 1 (after being given information about the type of audit opinion and 
about the firms which audited the fictional companies) on a scale of 10. After 
comprehending the experimental instruments, the experimental subjects were asked 
to answer manipulation check questions to determine their understanding of the cases 
presented to them. There were two manipulation checks, namely the question of the 
level of uncertainty in the capital markets and the question of the level of the 
accounting firm’s reputation. 
Table 1. 2 x 2 Between Subject Factorial Designs 
 
Treatments 
GCO 
No Yes 
Specialized industry accounting 
firms 
No Case 1 Case 2 
Yes Case 3 Case 4 
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3.2 Research Model, Operational Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Figure 1 shows the research model used to test the consequences of GCO for 
announcing firms. 
Figure 1. Research Model to Test GCO Consequences for Announcing Firms 
 
H1a 
 
 
          H1b 
  
 
Table 2 shows the variables, operational definitions of variables and variable 
measurements to test the consequences of GCO for announcing firms. 
Table 2. Variables, Operational Definition and Measurement 
Variable Operational Definition Measurement 
GCO Opinion issued when the auditor 
doubts the viability of the entity 
Code 1 if the company receives GCO 
and code 0 if the company receives an 
unqualified opinion  
SPE Accounting firm with specific 
expertise in a particular industry 
Code 1 if there is a specialist 
accounting firm and code 0 if there is 
no specialist accounting firm 
HSA The stock price of the company which 
receives GCO (announcing firms) 
Scales of 1 to 10. Scales of 1 to 5 
shows a decline in stock prices, while 
the scales of 6 to 10 show an increase 
in stock prices  
 
Figure 2 shows the research model used to test the consequences of GCO for rival 
firms. 
 
Going Concern 
Opinion (GCO)  
Stock Price of 
Announcing Firms  
(HSA) 
 
Industry- Specialized 
Accounting Firm (SPE) 
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Figure 2. Research Model to Test GCO Consequences for Rival Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the variables, operational definitions of variables and variables 
measurement to test the consequences of GCO for rival firms. 
Table 3. Variables, Operational Definition and Measurement 
Variables Operational Definition Measurement 
GCO Opinion issued when the auditor 
doubts the viability of the entity 
Codes 1, 2, 3, and 4 if the industry 
there are 2, 4, 6, and 8 GCOs. 
SPE Accounting firms with specific 
expertise in a particular industry 
Code 1 if there is a specialist 
accounting firm and code 0 if there is 
no specialist accounting firm 
HSR The stock price of companies which 
do not receive GCO (rival firms)  
Scales of 1 to 10. Scales of 1 to 5 
show a decrease in stock prices, while 
scales of 6 to 10 show an increase in 
stock prices  
 
Figure 3 shows the research model used to test the consequences of GCO for the 
capital market. 
 
Stock Price of 
Rival Firms 
(HSR) 
Going Concern 
Opinion (GCO) 
Industry-  
Specialized 
Accounting 
Firm  
(SPE) 
H2a 
H2b 
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Figure 3. Research Model to Test GCO Consequences for Capital Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the variables, operational definitions of variables and variable 
measurements to test the GCO consequences for capital markets. 
Table 4. Variables, Operational Definition and Measurement 
Variable Operational Definition  Measurement 
GCO Opinion issued when the auditor 
doubts the viability of the entity 
Code 1 if there is a GCO in the capital market 
and the code of 0 if there is no GCO in the 
capital market 
SPE Accounting firms with specific Code 1 if there is a specialist accounting firm 
H3e 
H3f 
H3d 
H3b 
Composite  
Index  
(COM) 
 
Going Concern  
Opinion  
(GCO) 
Industry-  
Specialized 
Accounting 
Firm (SPE) 
H3a 
H3c 
Stock Price of All  
Companies 
(HSS) 
Market  
Participants  
(MAR) 
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expertise in a particular industry and code 0 if there is no specialist accounting 
firm 
HSS Stock prices across the 
enterprises in both experimental 
markets 
Scales of 1 to 10. Scales of 1 to 5 shows a 
decline in stock prices, while scales of 6 to 10 
show an increase in stock prices 
COM The movement of all stock prices  
 
LN{CSPIt = Market Valuet x 100%} 
             Base Value 
 
 
MAR The parties participating in a 
capital market 
Scales of 1 to 10. Scales of 1 to 5 shows an 
unwillingness to participate, while scales of 6 to 
10 shows a willingness to participate in capital 
markets. 
CSPI= Composite Stock Price Index 
3.3 Data Analysis Methods 
The methods of analyses used in this research were a descriptive statistical analysis, 
ANOVA with Two-Way Interaction, and MANOVA with Interaction. The ANOVA 
analysis was used to test H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b, while the MANOVA analysis was 
used to test H3a up to H3f. 
IV. Discussion 
4.1 Results of Pilot Test 
The pilot test in this present study involved three undergraduate students and nine 
graduate students of STIE YKPN (YKPN Business School), Yogyakarta. After the 
subjects finished working on the cases, the subjects were asked to rate the clarity 
level of the presentation of the cases (scales of 1 to 10). Measuring the clarity level of 
the presentation of an experimental case like this was also conducted by 
Qimyatussa’adah et al. (2013). On the average, the subjects of the pilot test gave a 
value of 8, meaning that the presentation of the cases of the experiment was clear. 
4.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Experiment Subjects  
In all, 107 students of YKPN Business School participated in this experiment:  38 
males and 69 females. The average age of the subjects of the experiment was 22.8 
years. Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 were filled by the subjects of the experiment with 
comparable numbers. 
4.3 Results of Manipulation Check 
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In answering the manipulation check, 107 experimental subjects did it correctly, 
while 15 subjects did not answer correctly, and thus they were excluded in the further 
tests.  
4.4 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
The descriptive statistical analysis of this present study consisted of the minimum 
value, maximum value, and the average (presented in Table 1). Based on the results 
of the descriptive analysis, the average stock price of announcing firms was higher if 
announcing firms were audited by specialist accounting firms. The rival firms’ stock 
price was lower if other companies in the same industry were audited by a specialist 
accounting firm. In addition, the average stock price of all companies, the average 
composite index, and the average number of the market participants in the market 
with GCO were higher than those in the market without GCO. 
Based on the results of the descriptive analysis, the average stock price of 
announcing firms was lower if the announcing firms were audited by specialist 
accounting firms. The rival firms’ stock price was higher if the companies that 
received GCO were audited by specialist accounting firms. In addition, the average 
stock price of all companies, the average composite index, and the average number of 
the market participants in the market with GCO were higher than those in the market 
without GCO. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Experimental Market 
Market With GCO Market Without GCO 
Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 
HSA (Rp) All Accounting Firms 32 9,600 793 - - - 
Specialist  32 9,600 782 - - - 
Non-Specialist 32 9,000 805 - - - 
HSA (%) All Accounting Firms -36 36 -14 - - - 
Specialist -36 36 -16 - - - 
Non-Specialist -36 28 -11 - - - 
HSR (Rp) All Accounting Firms 115 13,600 3,137 - - - 
Specialist 115 13,600 3,256 - - - 
Non-Specialist 130 13,600 3,019 - - - 
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HSR (%) All Accounting Firms -28 36 3 - - - 
Specialist -36 36 5 - - - 
Non-Specialist -28 36 0,08 - - - 
HSS (Rp) All Accounting Firms 2,037 2,779 2,421 1,485 2,176 1,835 
Specialist 2,379 2,596 2,517 1,740 2,176 2,021 
Non-Specialist 2,037 2,779 2,325 1,485 1,938 1,651 
COM All Accounting Firms 95 134 119 67 101 85 
Specialist 117 129 126 75 101 93 
Non-Specialist 95 134 112 67 93 77 
MAR All Accounting Firms 5 10 7 1 7 4 
Specialist 7 10 8 1 6 4 
Non-Specialist 5 8 6 1 7 3 
Source: The data processing 
4.5 Testing Assumptions in the Analyses of Two-Way ANOVA with Interaction 
and MANOVA with Interaction  
The testing of the assumption of variance homogeneity using Levene's Test shows 
that the variance was not homogeneous (Gastwirth et al., 2009). According to Frutos 
(2009), Gastwirth et al. (2009), Osborne (2010), and Ghozali (2011), although it did 
not meet the assumption of variance homogeneity, an ANOVA analysis was still 
possible to be run because ANOVA is quite robust for the irregularities of the 
assumption of homogeneity from small to moderate levels. The test results of 
covariance matrix using Box'M Test show that the covariance matrix was 
homogeneous. The results of the variance error homogeneity testing using Levene's 
test indicate that the variance errors of all groups were homogeneous. The test data 
normality measurement using the Shapiro-Wilk indicates that the data were not 
normally distributed. According Ghozali (2011), although the data of this present 
study did not meet the assumptions of data normality, analysis of ANOVA and 
MANOVA were still possible to be conducted because of ANOVA and MANOVA 
analysis are robust for deviations of normality assumption from small to moderate 
levels. 
4.6 Hypothesis Testing and Discussion 
4.6.1 GCO Consequences for Announcing Firms 
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Hypothesis 1a that states that the stock-price estimation of announcing firms made by 
the financial analysts is lower when the auditor issues GCO than when the auditor 
issues an unqualified opinion is accepted as the significance of the F value is 0.000 
(less than 5%). This suggests that announcing firms bear the negative consequences 
of the GCO they receive. The results of this study are consistent with the results of 
the research conducted by Elliott et al. (2006), Schaub (2006), O’Reilly et al. (2006), 
O'Reilly (2010), Carson et al. (2012), Coelho et al. (2012) and Amin et al. (2014). 
The comparison of the average change in the stock price and the average stock price 
of Time 1 is presented in Table 6. Based on these tables, the companies with GCO 
experienced the decrease of their average stock price as much as 13.63%. On the 
other hand, companies with an unqualified opinion experienced an increase of their 
average stock price as much as 10.05%. Based on the table, the average stock-price 
estimation of Time 1 made by the experimental subjects was higher when a company 
received an unqualified opinion (Rp4,020) than when the company received GCO 
(Rp793). 
Table 6. Average Stock Price Change and Average Stock Price of Time 1 
Audit Opinion Accounting Firms 
Average Stock Price 
Change (%) 
Average Stock 
Price of Time 1 
(Rp) 
Unqualified 
Opinion 
All Accounting Firms 10,05 4.020 
Specialist 14,76 4.205 
Non-Specialist 5,35 3.836 
GCO All Accounting Firms -13,63 793 
Specialist -16,4 782 
Non-Specialist -10,85 805 
 
Hypothesis 1b which states that the specialized industry accounting firms can weaken 
the negative effect of GCO on the stock prices of announcing firms is unacceptable. 
Although the significance of the value of F at the GCO*SPE is 0.000 (less than 5%), 
the percentage decline in the stock prices of announcing firms audited by specialist 
accounting firms is higher than the percentage decline in the stock prices of 
announcing firms audited by non-specialist accounting firms. This suggests that the 
presence of specialist accounting firms has no role in weakening the negative 
consequences of the GCO to announcing firms’ stock prices. In other words, the 
hypothesis testing results prove that the presence of specialist accounting firms had a 
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significant role in strengthening the negative consequences of the GCO on the stock 
prices of announcing firms. 
Based on Table 6, announcing firms audited by the specialist accounting firms 
experienced a bigger decline in their stock prices than announcing firms audited by 
non-specialist accounting firms. The average decline in stock prices of announcing 
firms audited by specialist accounting firms was 16.4%, while the average decline in 
stock prices of announcing firms audited by non-specialist accounting firms were 
only 10.85%. In addition, the average stock price of Time 1 announcing firm audited 
by specialist accounting firms was lower than the average stock price of Time 1 
announcing firm audited by non-specialist accounting firms. The average stock price 
of the Time 1 announcing firm audited by the specialist accounting firm was Rp782, 
while the average stock price of Time 1 announcing firm audited by non-specialist 
accounting firms was Rp805. 
The table indicates that the presence of a specialist accounting firm increased the 
negative consequences of GCO to announcing firms’ stock prices. This happened 
possibly because the GCO issued by well-reputed accounting firms were considered 
to have a higher accuracy than the GCO issued by the accounting firm whose 
reputation is lower (DeAngelo, 1981; Geiger and Rama, 2006; Hapsoro and Aghasta, 
2013; Myers et al., 2014). In other words, specialist accounting firms are considered 
capable of providing better audit quality than non-specialist accounting firms 
(Balsam, 2003; Lim and Tan, 2009). Accounting firms specializing in a particular 
industry are seen as highly reputable accounting firms because they have a deeper 
understanding of the business and industry clients. GCO that has a high degree of 
accuracy can be an early warning for company bankruptcy. It is then reacted against 
negative by the stock price decline. 
The results of hypothesis testing 1 (GCO consequences for announcing firms) are 
shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Results of Hypothesis Testing 1 (GCO Consequences for Announcing 
Firms) 
Dependent Variable: HSA 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 33,672
a
 3 11,224 380,222 ,000 
Intercept ,659 1 ,659 22,336 ,000 
GCO_1 28,983 1 28,983 981,800 ,000 
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SPE_1 ,192 1 ,192 6,513 ,011 
GCO_1 * SPE_1 2,891 1 2,891 97,938 ,000 
Error 61,283 2076 ,030   
Total 95,565 2080    
Corrected Total 94,955 2079    
4.6.2 GCO Consequences for Rival Firms 
Hypothesis 2a which states that the stock prices of companies which did not receive 
GCO (rival firms) increase if other companies in the same industry receive GCO is 
accepted because the significance F value of the GCO is 0.000 (less than 5%). The 
results are consistent with research conducted by Elliot et al. (2006) and Coelho et al. 
(2012). The experimental market in this study consisted of four industries (Industry 
1, Industry 2, Industry 3, and Industry 4). Every industry consisted of 10 fictional 
companies. The numbers of announcing firms in each industry were respectively two, 
four, six, and eight, while the numbers of the rival firms in each industry were eight, 
six, four and two. The comparison of the average change in the stock price and the 
average stock price of Time 1 is presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Average Stock Price Change and Average Stock Price Time 1 
Indust
ry 
The Number 
of GCO 
Accounting Firms 
Average Stock 
Price Change 
(%) 
Average of 
Stock Price 
Time 1 (Rp) 
1 2 GCO All Accounting Firms 21,39 6.643 
Specialist 27,79 6.973 
Non-Specialist 15 6.314 
2 4 GCO All Accounting Firms 15,96 2.485 
Specialist 23,09 2.621 
Non-Specialist 8,83 2.349 
3 6 GCO All Accounting Firms -7,36 2.694 
Specialist -5,21 2.746 
Non-Specialist -9,5 2.642  
4 8 GCO All Accounting Firms -18,86 726 
Specialist -23,71 683 
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Non-Specialist -14 769 
 
Based on Table 7, Industry 1 that had 2 GCOs experienced a stock price increase of 
21.39%, while Industry 2 that had 4 GCOs experienced a stock price increase of 
15.96%. It can be said that Industry 1 and Industry 2 experienced the competitive 
effect because the rival firms’ stock prices rose. Industry 3 that had 6 GCOs 
experienced a stock price decline of 7.36%, while Industry 4 that had 8 GCOs 
experienced a stock price decline of 18.86%. It can be said that Industry 3 and 
Industry 4 experienced the effect because the rival firms experienced a decline in 
stock prices. The results of this study prove that competitive effect can be turned into 
contagion effect if the number of the announcing firms is higher than the number of 
the rival firms. 
Hypothesis 2b which states that the specialized industry accounting firms can weaken 
the GCO positive influence on the rival firms’ stock prices cannot be accepted. 
Although the significance of the value of F at the GCO*SPE is 0.000 (less than 5%), 
the percentage increase in the stock prices of the rival firms is higher when 
announcing firms are audited by specialist accounting firms than when announcing 
firms are audited by non-specialist accounting firms.  
This suggests that the presence of specialist accounting firms does not weaken the 
positive consequences of GCO on announcing firms’ stock prices. In other words, the 
hypothesis testing results prove that the existence of specialist accounting firms has a 
significant role in strengthening the positive consequences of GCO to the rival firms’ 
stock prices. 
Based on Table 7, in Industry 1 and Industry 2 the increase of the rival firms’ stock 
prices was higher when the announcing firms were audited by specialist accounting 
firms than when they were audited by non-specialist accounting firms. The increases 
of rival firms’ stock prices in Industry 1 and Industry 2 for specialist accounting 
firms were respectively 27.79% and 23.09%, while the increases of the rival firms’ 
stock prices in Industry 1 and Industry 2 for non-specialist accounting firms were 
respectively 15 % and 8.83%. On the other hand, the decline in the rival firms’ stock 
prices in Industry 3 and Industry 4 for specialized industry accounting firms was 
respectively 7.36% and 18.86%, while the decline in the rival firms’ stock prices in 
Industry 3 and Industry 4 for non-specialist accounting firms was respectively 9.5% 
and 23.71%. 
Table 7 indicates that the presence of a specialist accounting firm can strengthen the 
positive consequences of GCO to the rival firms’ stock prices. This is because GCO 
issued by well-reputed accounting firms have a higher accuracy rate than the GCO 
issued by the firm whose reputation is lower (DeAngelo, 1981; Geiger and Rama, 
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2006; Hapsoro and Aghasta, 2013; Myers et al., 2014). GCO that has a high degree 
of accuracy can be an early warning for company bankruptcy. Then, stakeholders of 
companies with potential bankruptcy (announcing firms) will be more motivated to 
move the focus of their business to other companies in the same industry (rival 
firms). 
The results of hypothesis testing 2 (GCO consequences for rival firms) are shown in 
Table 9. 
Table 9. Results of Hypothesis Testing 2 (GCO Consequences for Rival Firms) 
Dependent Variable: HSR 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 25,827
a
 7 3,690 271,031 ,000 
Intercept ,616 1 ,616 45,262 ,000 
GCO_2 21,309 3 7,103 521,790 ,000 
SPE_2 ,580 1 ,580 42,595 ,000 
GCO_2 * SPE_2 1,381 3 ,460 33,814 ,000 
Error 14,049 1032 ,014   
Total 51,008 1040    
Corrected Total 39,876 1039    
 
4.6.3 GCO Consequences for Capital Market 
Hypothesis 3a which states that the stock price on the market of a company with 
GCO is higher than the stock price on the market of a company without GCO is 
accepted because the significance value of F at HSS is 0.000 (less than 5%). The 
comparison of the average stock prices of all companies in both experimental 
markets is presented in Table 5. Based on this table, the average stock price of all 
companies in the market with GCO is higher than the average stock price of all 
companies in the market without GCO. The average stock price of all companies in 
the market with GCO was Rp2,421, while the average stock price of all companies in 
the market without GCO was only Rp1,835. This suggests that the presence of GCO 
in a capital market can make the stock prices of all companies higher. The existence 
of GCO can minimize the uncertain condition in a capital market. 
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Hypothesis 3b which states that the specialized industry accounting firms can 
strengthen the positive impact of GCO to the stock price on a stock market is 
accepted as the significance of the value of F at the GCO*SPE for the dependent 
variable HSS (the average stock price of all companies) was 0,000 (less than 5%). 
These results indicate that the stock price in the market of companies with GCO is 
higher than the stock price in the market of companies without GCO. Thus, the 
presence of specialist accounting firms can strengthen the positive effect of the GCO 
on stock prices in a capital market. 
Table 5 illustrates the role of the specialist accounting firm in a capital market. The 
average stock price of all companies will be higher in the capital market with 
specialist accounting firms than the average stock price of all companies in the stock 
market without specialist accounting firms. The average stock price of all companies 
in the market with GCO audited by specialist accounting firms was by Rp2,517, 
while the average stock price of all companies in the market with GCO audited by 
non-specialist accounting firms were Rp2,325. The average stock price of all 
companies in the market without GCO audited by the specialist accounting firm was 
by Rp2,021, while the average price of all companies in the stock market without 
GCO audited by non-specialist accounting firm was only Rp1,651. It can be said that 
specialist accounting firms can strengthen the positive consequences of GCO in a 
capital market. 
Hypothesis 3c which states that the composite index is higher in the market with 
GCO than the composite index in the market without GCO is accepted as the 
significance value of F at the GCO for the dependent variable COM (composite 
index) is 0.000 (less than 5%). The comparison of the average composite indexes in 
both experimental markets is presented in Table 5. Based on this table, the average 
composite index in a market with GCO is higher than the average composite index in 
the market without GCO. The average composite index in the market with GCO 
was119 while the average composite index on the market without GCO was only 85. 
This shows that the presence of GCO in a capital markets may lead to higher 
composite index.  
Hypothesis 3d which states that the specialized industry accounting firms can 
strengthen the positive influence of the GCO on the composite index is accepted 
because the significance value of F at the GCO*SPE for the dependent variable COM 
(composite index) is 0.000 (less than 5%). These results indicate that the composite 
index in a market with GCO is higher than the composite index on the market 
without GCO. Thus, the presence of specialist accounting firms can strengthen the 
positive influence of GCO on the composite index in a capital market. 
Table 5 illustrates the role of the specialist accounting firms in a capital markets. The 
average composite index will be higher in the capital market in which there is 
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specialist accounting firms than the average composite index in the capital market 
without any specialist accounting firms. The average composite index in a market 
with GCO audited by the specialist accounting firm was 1,126, while the average 
composite index in a market with GCO audited by non-specialist accounting firm 
was only 112. On the other hand, the average composite index on the market without 
GCO audited by specialist accounting firms was 93, while the average composite 
index on the market without GCO audited by non-specialist accounting firms was 
only 77. It can be said that the specialist accounting firm can strengthen the positive 
consequences of GCO on a capital market. 
Hypothesis 3e, which states that the number of market participants in a market with 
GCO is higher than the number of market participants in a market without GCO is 
accepted because the significance value of F at the GCO for the dependent variable 
MAR (market participant) was 0.000 (less than 5%). The level of uncertainty in the 
market without GCO is higher than the level of uncertainty in the market with GCO. 
If in a stock market there are companies that acquire GCO, investors will find it 
difficult to identify companies with doubtful survival. Based on these results, the 
market participants are more willing to participate in the capital market with GCO 
because the uncertainty is lower. 
The comparison of the average level of willingness of the market participants in both 
experimental markets is presented in Table 5. The market participants’ willingness 
level was measured using a scale of 10 points. The lowest figure 1 shows that after 
observing the condition of the capital markets, market participants are not willing to 
participate in the capital market. The highest figure, 10, shows that after observing 
the condition of the capital markets, market participants are willing to participate in 
the capital market. Based on the table, the average level of willingness to participate 
in a market without GCO was 4 and the average level of willingness to participate in 
a market with GCO was 7. This suggests that the presence of GCO in a capital 
market can increase market participants’ willingness to participate in the capital 
market. The existence of GCO can minimize uncertainty in the capital markets so 
that market participants’ willingness to participate in the market with GCO is higher 
than their willingness to participate in the market without GCO. 
Hypothesis 3f which states that the specialized industry accounting firms can 
strengthen the GCO positive influence on the market participants in a capital market 
is accepted because the significance of the value of F at the GCO*MAR for the 
dependent variable SPE (market participant) was 0.000 (less than 5%). Based on 
these results, it can be concluded that market participants are willing to participate in 
a capital market with GCO because the uncertainty is lower. Thus, the presence of 
specialist accounting firms can strengthen the positive effects of GCO on market 
participants in a capital market. 
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Table 5 illustrates the role of the specialist accounting firms in a capital markets. 
Market participants’ average level of willingness to participate in a capital market in 
which there are specialists accounting firms was higher than that in the capital market 
without any specialist accounting firm. The average level of willingness to participate 
in the market with GCO audited by specialist accounting firms was 8, while the 
average level of willingness to participate in the market with GCO audited by non-
specialist accounting firm was only 6. Similarly, the level of willingness to 
participate in the market without GCO audited by specialist accounting firms was 4, 
while the average level of willingness to participate in the market without GCO 
audited by non-specialist accounting firm was 3. It can be said that the specialist 
accounting firms can strengthen the positive consequences of GCO on a capital 
market. 
The results of hypothesis testing 3 (GCO consequences for capital markets) are 
shown in Table 10. 
Table 10. Results of Hypothesis Testing 3 (GCO Consequences for Capital Markets) 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected 
Model 
HSS_LN 2,683
a
 3 ,894 408,734 ,000 
COM_LN 3,568
b
 3 1,189 417,550 ,000 
MAR 462,323
c
 3 154,108 93,425 ,000 
Intercept 
HSS_LN 6236,245 1 6236,245 2850040,144 ,000 
COM_LN 2263,841 1 2263,841 794873,811 ,000 
MAR 3140,823 1 3140,823 1904,073 ,000 
GCO_3 
HSS_LN 2,103 1 2,103 961,194 ,000 
COM_LN 3,031 1 3,031 1064,079 ,000 
MAR 340,907 1 340,907 206,669 ,000 
SPE_3 
HSS_LN ,534 1 ,534 243,826 ,000 
COM_LN ,597 1 ,597 209,444 ,000 
MAR 3,995 1 3,995 2,422 ,123 
GCO_3* 
SPE_3 
HSS_LN ,098 1 ,098 44,984 ,000 
COM_LN ,031 1 ,031 10,890 ,001 
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MAR 102,766 1 102,766 62,300 ,000 
Error 
HSS_LN ,225 103 ,002   
COM_LN ,293 103 ,003   
MAR 169,901 103 1,650   
Total 
HSS_LN 6256,790 107    
COM_LN 2270,837 107    
MAR 3787,000 107    
Corrected 
Total 
HSS_LN 2,908 106    
COM_LN 3,861 106    
MAR 632,224 106    
 
V.  Closing 
5.1 Conclusion 
The GCO consequence for announcing firms is that the stock prices of announcing 
firms will decline. The decline will be greater if they are audited by specialist 
accounting firms. The GCO consequence for rival firms is that their stock prices will 
increase if other companies in the same industry receive GCO. Such increase will be 
greater if they receive GCO from a specialist accounting firm. The GCO consequence 
for capital markets is that the stock prices of all companies, the composite index, and 
the market participation will be higher. The presence of a specialist accounting firm 
is proven to strengthen the positive consequences. 
5.2 Limitations and Suggestions 
This study at least has four limitations. First, the subjects of this experiment were not 
financial analysts, but students who were asked to act as financial analysts. Future 
studies are expected to use real financial analysts as the subjects of experiments so 
that the results of the stock price estimation can be more reliable Second, the 
preparation of the experimental instruments was quite difficult because there had 
been no previous studies that simultaneously observed the consequences of GCO for 
announcing firms, rival firms, and capital markets. Future studies are expected to 
include more consultation with the parties who have expertise in the preparation of 
the experimental instruments. Third, there was only one auditor reputation proxy 
used in this study, namely industry specialization. Future studies are expected to add 
other proxies for auditor reputation such as the size and age of the accounting firms. 
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Fourth, the industry specialization analysis unit used in this study was only at the 
office level.  
Future studies are expected to simultaneously use the unit analyzes for industry 
specialization in the office level and at the partner level (Obbens 2010; Karjalainen, 
2011; Jiang et al., 2012) so that the role of industry specialization at each level can be 
discussed in more depth. 
 
5.3 Implications 
Unlike an unqualified opinion, which is expected by of all parties, GCO is an 
unpopular opinion because it reflects considerable doubt upon the entity's ability to 
maintain its viability. However, if there is no GCO in a stock market, companies’ 
stock price, composite index, and the market participation in the capital markets will 
tend to be low. This shows that GCO is good news for a stock market. The presence 
of specialized accounting firms in the capital markets can increase the average stock 
price of all companies, the composite index, and market participation. This suggests 
that the presence of a specialist accounting firm can strengthen the positive 
consequences of GCO for capital markets.  
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